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STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL COURT
EDWIN M. BORCHARD*
For an adequate understanding of the origin, jurisdictiori and
functions of the newly established court of international justice at
the Hague, it will be necessary to revert to the two Hague Confer-
ences of 1899 and 1907 and to examine the organization of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration at the Hague created and developed at:
those Conferences. The characteristic feature of the Court of Arbi--
tration as distinguished from the new Permanent Court of Justice
lies in the fact that the personnel of the former consists of an eligible
list or panel, of which there are now some one hundred and twenty
persons throughout the world, from which the two nations proposing
to enter into arbitration may select their judges for the particular
case, whereas the new court has a fixed bench whose members have
a tenure of nine years and are subject to re-election. The word "per-
manent" used in both titles refers-to the institution itself, for which
permanency was designed, rather than to the composition of the court.
The movement to establish a fixed tribunal with obligatory juris-
diction reaches far back into history, but has always proved abortive
for reasons which I shall later venture to suggest. Its modern devel-
opment is more closely identified with the United States, always at
leading proponent of arbitration, than with any other country. At
the Hague Conference of 1907 the United States proposed the estab-
lishment of such a fixed court with a constant personnel, denominated'
Court of Arbitral Justice;, but the inability to agree upon a method for
the selection of seven or nine judges from some forty states wreckecd
the plan, just as it did the plan for the establishment of an Inter-
national Prize Court.
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Some of the dominating reasons inspiring the current movement
for ,the creation of the fixed court rested upon a certain dissatisfac-
tion with courts of arbitration, which I cannot find altogether justi-
fied. It was argued that courts of arbitration decide cases not by
fixed principles of law but by methods of diplomatic compromise, and
that a well-developed and systematic body of international law re-
quired a fixed court with certainty and continuity in the application
of legal principles, on the analogy of municipal courts. It was not
easy to determine from this argument whether the court was to exist
for the sake of the law, or the law for the court. But I believe the
argument without substantial justification. A somewhat exhaustive
analysis of the hundreds of arbitrations to be found in Mr. Moore's
monumental work and in repositories like Ralston and La Fontaine
and other works, has convinced me that principles of law are con-
stantly and almost uniformly applied by international tribunals of ar-
bitration, with a respect for precedent hardly less than that of muni-
cipal courts; and if it is believed that the element of compromise is
wanting in the adjudications of municipal courts I invite attention
to judge Cardozo's notable work on "The Nature of the Judicial Pro-
cess." Nor do I believe that municipal law has reached that stage
of certainty which justifies serious disparagement of international law
in this regard-at least the law of peace-though I freely admit that
the many and varied interpreters of the two systems respectively have
disproportionate power to give effect to their own particular views on
a rule of law. Thus, the rules of international law may seem more
uncertain because nations, acting upon their own view, refuse to alter
it to accommodate it to that of another nation or even of an interna-
tional tribunal in which they do not appear. Note, for example, the
American view of the most-favored-nation clause and the superiority,
constitutionally speaking, of statutes over earlier and conflicting inter-
national treaties.
But it can hardly be doubted that any new agency to encourage
the amicable submission of international disputes serves a valuable pub-
lic purpose and should strengthen the fabric of law among the nations.
Hence the new court must be welcomed. It is distinctly provided in
the statute creating the court, that the existing Court of Arbitration
is not to be superseded, however; for besides having decided some
twenty very important cases, the limitations upon the jurisdiction of
the new court of justice make it seem probable that the old court may
receive in the future as many important cases as the new."
The new court owes its origin to the Covenant of the League of
Nations, and the inclusion of the operative clause is in all probability
largely due to the efforts of the United States. Whatever view we
may entertain as to the League, whether we regard it as a hopeful
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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL COURT
experiment or a disappointing panacea, it can hardly be denied that
the machinery it devised for the creation of the court and particularly
for the selection of its judges solved a problem which the second
Hague Conference had found too difficult. The Council of the League,
to whom the Covenant entrusted the execution of the plan, organized
an international advisory committee of jurists to formulate and sub-
mit an organic statute for the constitution of the new court. The
Advisory Committee was made up of Mr. Adatci, Japanese Minister
at Brussels, M. Rafael Altamira, Professor of Law at Madrid, Baron
Descamps, a veteran in the movement for arbitration, Dr. Francis
Hagerup, formerly Professor of Law at Christiania and a leading
statesman of his country, M. de Lapradelle, Professor of Law at Paris,
Dr. Loder of Holland, a member of the Dutch Supreme Court, Lord
Phillimore of the Privy Council in England, M. Ricci-Busatti, legal
advisor to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Professor of
Law at Rome, and Mr. Elihu Root, former Secretary of State. Mr.
Clovis Bevilaqua, Professor of Law at Pernambuco, was unable to
be present. The qualifications of these men are a guaranty 'of the
sincerity and character of the work they produced.
This committee incorporated in the statute a proposal for the
obligatory jurisdiction of the court, which in my judgment constitutes
one of the principal justifications for the creation of a new, and par-
ticularly of a fixed court with determinate personnel. But on the
ground that this would in effect constitute an amendment of the
Covenant, which left jurisdiction voluntary, the Council of the League,
dominated by the larger powers, eliminated the provision for obliga-
tory jurisdiction-therein again exemplifying the experience of 1907
-though permitting nations to agree to obligatory jurisdiction if they
so desired. In thus refusing to grant the court obligatory jurisdiction.
which in the present stage of international relations is hardly sur-
prising, one of the major weaknesses of the new court is apparent.
The larger powers still prefer to be the judges of their own causes,
and the sheriffs as well, and resist any plan to bring about an obligatory
submission of dispute to judicial or other determination. Fortunately,
some fifteen of the smaller states have signed the provision for oblig-
.atory jurisdiction; spasmodic and ephemeral treaties for this purpose
between a few individual states have thus been enlarged into an or-
ganic convention which new states may join by the simple procedure
of adherence. It is to be hoped that the example of the smaller states
will by force of public opinion, prove contagious to the larger powers.
But if experience is any guide, nations that are not compelled to sub-
mit their dispute to a court will, if they submit it at all, prefer to have
some voice in the selection of their judges, and will refuse to litigate
rather than submit to a rigid court if they believe only a single iud e
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of the eleven to be prejudiced against them, nationally or in his view
of the law of the case. The minuteness with which the United States
combed the records of prospective nominees for the Court of Arbi-
tration which decided the Fisheries dispute between the United States
and Great Britain in 1910 impressed me with the reluctance of nations
not bound to arbitrate, to submit to judges they cannot individually
select and agree upon. Fixity of the judges of the court is more likely
to deter than encourage the larger nations to litigate, though for-
tunately the Court of Arbitration with its eligible list is still in opera-
tion, and to it the United States and Norway have just submitted a
dispute arising out of the requisitioning of Norwegian ships by the
United States during the war.
One of the sources of strength of the new court is the calibre of
the men elected to it by the Council and Assembly of the League, to
whom this function was entrusted by the Covenant. The judges were
nominated by the existing national groups of the members of the Court
of Arbitration in each country, who were empowered to nominate
from two to four candidates, not more than two from their own coun-
try. From a list of eighty-nine thus nominated, the Council and As-
sembly then elected eleven judges and four deputies, taking into con-
sideration the fact that the principal legal systems had to find repre-
sentation and that not more than one judge could come from any one
country. In its reconciliation of national representation with supe-
rior mental equipment, or I might say, subordination of the former
to the latter, the League has performed a noteworthy service, hitherto
found impossible. The Judges of the Court are Professor Andr&
Weiss, Professor of International Law at Paris; Dr. Dionisio Anzi-
lotti, Professor of International Law at Rome; Dr. Rafael Altamira,
Professor of Legislation at Madrid; Ruy Barbosa, a famous Brazilian
lawyer and statesman; Antonio Bustamante, lawyer and Professor of
International Law at Havana; Viscount Finlay, now of the British
House of Lords; Max Huber, Professor of Public Law at Zurich and
Advisor of the Swiss Foreign Office; B. C. J. Loder, member of the
Dutch Supreme Court; Didrik Nyholm, President of the Mixed Court
at Cairo; Yorozu Oda, Professor of International Law at Kyoto; and
John Bassett Moore, the dean of American authorities on international
law. The four deputy-judges are Dr. Negulescu, Professor of Law
at Bucharest; C. H. Wang, President of the Chinese Supreme Court;
Dr. Jovanovich, Professor of Law at Belgrade; and Dr. F. V. N.
Beichmann, President of the Court of Appeal, Trondhjem, Norway.
The men selected are among the outstanding lawyers and judges of
the world, and law teachers may feel some satisfaction in the fact that
almost all of them are or have been professors of law in some leading
university.
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The court is open not only to states, members of the League, but
also to other States, mentioned in the Annex of the Covenant, who
may sign the protocol by which the statute is accepted. Among these
is the United States, and it is hoped that this country will soon formally
join in this useful work, which has no relation to the political respon-
sibilities contemplated by other parts of the Covenant. In the near
future, the court will doubtless be opened to every state in the world.
The jurisdiction of the court is confined mainly to legal ques-
tions, concerning primarily the interpretation of treaties, questions of
international law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation or the nature or
extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation, the interpretation of the court's judgments, or any other
question the parties may submit. The Communications and Labor
Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles (Parts XII and XIII) and of
the corresponding parts of other treaties look to the submission of
differences to the court. They will doubtless in the beginning furnish
the majority of the cases for the court's attention. In addition, the
court is given power to render advisory opinions to the Council or
Assembly of the League.
In view of the limited jurisdiction of the court, consisting of what
have been called justiciable or strictly legal questions, the reluctance
of the larger Powers to make jurisdiction in these cases obligatory is
to be regretted. It is an indication of the fact that we are still a long
way from the substitution of amicable for belligerent methods in the
settlement of international disputes. One of the necessary weaknesses
of the court consists in the very fact that it is not likely to prove an
effective agency in removing or even minimizing for a long time to
come the bane of war from the recognized institutions of international
relations. This weakness goes to the very root of international rela-
tions in what I venture to call this medieval age. No mere addition
of machinery can create that necessary will to peace which is the most
effective guaranty of the efficacy of an International Court. The un-
willingness to submit to judicial settlement is conditioned by underly-
ing factors inherent in the existing international system, which per-
suades nations to decline to submit what they consider important is-
sues to the arbitrament of external judges. Note the almost uniform
exception of questions of independence, national honor and vital in-
terests from arbitration treaties. The judicial process is weakened by
a stipulation that there shall be no submission of anything important.
This weakness of the court, in its dependence upon the existing
order of international life, by the fact that international relations are
conditioned among the larger powers upon a continual struggle for
economic or political advantage raising issues which are not in any
ILLINOIS LAW QUARTERLY
degree legal in their nature and, therefore, incapable of determination
by judicial processes, necessarily reduces its usefulness as an agency
for peace. Whether the Argentine or the Chinese market shall be
controlled and in what degree by British, German, French, Japanese,
or American commerce; whether the unsuccessful competitors will
become reconciled to their defeat; whether the coaling, oil or cable
stations of the world are too largely controlled by certain nations for
the safety of the foreign trade of other countries; in what degree the
raw materials of the mandated territories and of colonies shall be
monopolized by the countries in immediate control-these questions,
typical merely, present no issue of legal right or wrong. Yet it is
these conflicts of interest that largely furnish the effective causes of
war. Is it not apparent, therefore, that so long as international trade
implies rivalry between national units organized- politically and com-
mercially with all the instruments of unfair competition, the hope of
an international court as a substitute for war rests on the weakest of
justifications? No such economic issues are presented by the differ-
ences among the states of the United States with their free trade; so
that the analogy for the new court sought to be found in our Supreme
Court, with its obligatory jurisdiction, is unwarranted and misleading.
Nor is it, I fear, true that nations seriously desire an international
court for the settlement of their difficulties. Nations may wish to sub-
mit to an international court-and have no difficulty in establishing
one ad hoc when the occasion arises-when the dispute is unimportant
or would not justify the expense of war or when .political considera-
tions dictate submission to arbitration rather than recourse to war-
in short when peaceful settlement seems more profitable than war. In
1914, President Wilson, then engaged in concluding the so-called Bryan
treaties for commissions of inquiry, refused to submit to such inquiry
the Tampico incident, when two Mexican subordinates were alleged
to have insulted the American flag, but at once in ebullient patriotism
despatched American forces with tragic results to Vera Cruz. Presi-
dent Huerta was thus to be convinced that he was persona non grata
in Washington. France resents the efforts of Great Britain to deter-
mine by peaceful methods continental disputes in which France has an
interest, preferring to rely for satisfactory results upon her large and
unemployed army. Chile, holding Tacna and Arica, resists the efforts
of Peru to submit this long-standing dispute to arbitration. While
peaceful settlement even of legal questions is therefore by no means
insured by the establishment of an international court, I nevertheless
believe that a permanent organization ready to deal with cases when-
ever they arise will exert an important influence particularly upon pub-
lic opinion to induce the nations to form a habit of submission of legal
questions, and if the court proves its ability and value by the char-
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acter of its decisions, this habit is sure to grow and the prestige of
the court certain to be increased.
It would be wrong to assume, I think, that a peaceful decision,
judicial or other, is necessarily a guaranty of peace. One need but
refer the student of American history to the Dred Scott decision to be
convinced of this. Some years ago Peru and Ecuador submitted their
boundary dispute to the arbitration of the Spanish Council of State;
but the conclusion of the Council having become known, both nations
joined in a request for the withholding of the award on the ground
that its publication would cause war. The experience with the Silesian
plebiscite exemplifies the occasional reluctance to be bound by solemn
verdicts. The Panama-Costa Rican hostilities are still fresh in mind.
Nevertheless, I would not leave this discussion without some feel-
ing of hope in the development of the new international court to a
position of great influence among the nations. Our own Supreme
Court vWas not overburdened with cases in the early days of its exist-
ence and there was some doubt as to whether it would ever be accepted
by the country. It is to be hoped that the realization that suicide of
the existing civilization will be the ultimate result of a continuation
of the present disastrous methods of adjusting international conflicts
of economic and political interests, will persuade the peoples of the
world to confer an ever-growing jurisdiction upon and to employ with
increasing frequency the civilized institutions exemplified by the Per-
manent Court of International Justice.
